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Abstract 
 This study examines the impact of improvements in institutional oversight 
specifically for compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
on accrual quality in Europe. The sample comprises 9339 firm-year observations 
from a treatment sample of three European countries that had either non-existent 
or relatively weak institutional oversight systems at the start of the sample period 
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sample relative to the benchmark sample from the pre-enforcement period 2006-07 
to the enforcement period 2008-10. The results suggest that institutional oversight 
has an incrementally positive impact on accrual quality over and above that 
attributable to legal system, rule of law and other variables. The results are robust 
to different measures of accrual quality, alternative enforcement proxy and 
alternative samples.  
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The Impact of Improvements in Institutional Oversight on 
IFRS Accrual Quality in Europe 
 
 
Introduction 
This study examines whether improved institutional oversight of compliance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe leads to improved 
accrual quality. The adoption of IFRS in Europe and other developed economies is 
one of the most significant developments in financial reporting.1 The global adoption 
of IFRS was motivated by the argument that the adoption of a single set of high 
quality standards would improve the reporting quality across the world and reduce 
international financial reporting diversity (Whittington 2005).2  
However, the academic, regulatory and professional literature suggests that the 
mere adoption of IFRS without a rigorous enforcement regime would not improve 
reporting quality (Brown 2011; European Communities [EC] 2002; Fédération des 
Experts Comptables Européens [FEE] 2001, 2002; Holthausen 2009; Pope and 
McLeay 2011; United States Securities and Exchange Commission [US SEC] 2000). 
Since IFRS are principles-based standards, which allow accounting discretion and 
require managers to make judgments and estimates, a rigorous enforcement 
mechanism is needed to ensure compliance with the standards. The European IFRS 
Regulation describes the importance of rigorous enforcement of accounting 
standards, particularly a common approach to enforcement, as follows: 
A proper and rigorous enforcement regime is key to underpinning investors' confidence 
in financial markets. Member States, by virtue of Article 10 of the Treaty, are required 
to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with international accounting 
standards. The Commission intends to liaise with Member States, notably through 
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the Committee of European Securities Regulators [CESR], to develop a common 
approach to enforcement [emphasis added]. (EC 2002, recital n. 16) 
 
Consistent with the emphasis on the enforcement of IFRS in the European IFRS 
Regulation, the then CESR developed two standards on accounting enforcement. 
Standard No. 1 prescribes the essential principles for IFRS enforcement activity by 
European national enforcement bodies and is expected to serve as the basis of 
harmonisation of institutional oversight across Europe (CESR 2003). Standard No. 2 
provides for sharing and discussion of enforcement decisions at a pan-European 
forum for the purpose of achieving harmonised enforcement practices (CESR 2004).  
During the period 2006 to 2010, European national enforcement bodies have 
complied with Standard No. 1, shared their enforcement decisions with other 
national enforcers and discussed those decisions at European Enforcers Co-
ordination Sessions (EECS) (CESR 2007, 2010b; European Securities and Markets 
Authority [ESMA] 2011). The stated objectives of all these institutional oversight 
activities in Europe are to monitor and ensure compliance of financial statements 
with IFRS and to ensure that a consistent approach to enforcement is implemented 
across European countries. 
However, not all European countries started accounting enforcement in the same 
year. For example, CESR (2007) notes that some countries (e.g., Belgium, Finland, 
and France) had full enforcement activity in 2006, while others (e.g., Germany, 
Ireland, and Sweden) had either partial or no enforcement activity in the same year. 
This differential enforcement activity by European countries offers a unique 
opportunity to examine the impact of enforcement activity on accrual quality. 
European countries invested a considerable amount of resources – time, money 
and efforts – in establishing institutional oversight systems to ensure compliance 
with IFRS. This suggests that European countries expect that institutional oversight 
over IFRS compliance will be able to make incremental contribution to reporting 
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quality over and beyond rule of law; otherwise it is difficult to justify the investment 
of a considerable amount of resources in establishing institutional oversight systems 
and monitoring compliance with IFRS. Therefore, from the perspectives of theory and 
policy prescriptions, it is important to examine whether institutional oversight over 
compliance with IFRS contributes to financial reporting quality (Brown 2011; 
Holthausen 2009; Pope and McLeay 2011). This paper examines this issue 
empirically. 
The paper uses a difference-in-difference research design for two groups of 
countries – a treatment sample of three European countries with either no or weak 
institutional oversight systems during 2006 but improved oversight systems after 
that, and a benchmark sample of six other European countries that had reasonably 
strong oversight systems in 2006. It compares the change in accrual quality in the 
treatment sample over the sample period with that of the benchmark sample during 
the same period. The sample comprises 9,339 firm-year observations and covers five 
years – 2006-10.   
This paper finds incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment 
sample over and above the benchmark sample from 2006-7 to 2008-10. The results 
are robust to alternative measures of accrual quality, alternative samples and 
alternative enforcement proxy. The results support the hypothesis that institutional 
oversight over compliance with IFRS makes incrementally positive contribution to 
accrual quality over and beyond the rule of law and have relevance for accounting 
policymakers of countries that are planning to adopt IFRS in the future. 
There is an emerging literature on the benefits of IFRS enforcement (Brown et al. 
2013; Christensen et al. 2013; Hitz et al. 2012; Preiato et al. 2013). Unlike these prior 
studies that examine market based measures of accounting quality (e.g., analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and dispersion, market liquidity), this paper examines a different 
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outcome variable – accrual quality and contributes to this emerging literature on 
IFRS enforcement and its consequences.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review and section 3 describes institutional oversight systems in Europe to ensure 
compliance with IFRS. Section 4 develops the hypothesis and Section 5 discusses 
the methodology. Section 6 reports the results and the last section provides a 
summary and conclusion. 
 
Literature review 
This study is related to two streams of accounting literature. The first stream debates 
the pros and cons of the adoption of IFRS and examines the impact of IFRS on 
various reporting outcomes. The second stream argues that IFRS would not improve 
reporting quality unless they are enforced strictly. 
 
IFRS and reporting quality 
The major argument in favour of IFRS is that they will enhance the transparency and 
comparability of financial reporting by listed companies across the borders 
(Whittington 2005). This, in turn, will contribute to the efficient and cost-effective 
functioning of the capital market, help protect the interests of investors and maintain 
their confidence in the financial market, facilitate the free flow of capital across 
borders, and create a level playing field for companies that compete for financial 
resources in the adopting countries (Armstrong et al. 2010; Florou and Pope 2009; 
Jones and Finley 2011; Li 2010). These were the principal motivations for the 
adoption of IFRS in Europe (EC 2002). Others argue that comparability of financial 
reporting across countries is unlikely as IFRS allow alternative accounting 
treatments and IFRS implementation will vary conditional on managers’ reporting 
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incentives, national institutions and cultures (Isidro and Raonic 2012; Kvaal and 
Nobes 2012; Schipper 2005; Soderstrom and Sun 2007).  
A growing number of studies examine the impacts of IFRS on various outcome 
variables but have mixed findings. Outcome variables include market reaction 
(Armstrong et al., 2010), value relevance of earnings and book value (Clarkson et al., 
2011; Goodwin et al., 2008; Liao et al. (2012)), income smoothing and timeliness of 
loss recognition (Chua et al., 2012), variability of financial statements ratios (Jones 
and Finley, 2011), earnings management (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008), 
discretionary accruals (Callao and Jarne, 2010; Kabir et al. (2010), and accounting 
policy choices (Kvaal and Nobes, 2012; Nobes, 2011).  
 
IFRS, enforcement and reporting quality 
Since IFRS allow reporting discretion, it is argued that IFRS would not improve 
reporting quality unless they are supported by a rigorous enforcement mechanism 
(EC 2002; FEE 2001, 2002; Holthausen 2009; US SEC 2000). The European IFRS 
Regulation underscores the importance of a rigorous enforcement regime and calls 
for the development of a common approach to enforcement (EC 2002).  
Several studies document reporting benefits of strong rule of law (Armstrong et al. 
2010; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Florou and Pope, 2009). Despite having relatively 
strong rule of law, with the adoption of IFRS, European countries started designing 
and implementing institutional oversight systems for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with IFRS (CESR 2007, 2010b; ESMA 2011). These enforcement efforts 
include the establishment of national oversight bodies in European countries and 
the monitoring and enforcement of IFRS by these oversight bodies (CESR 2007, 
2010b; ESMA 2011).  Thus, it is important from the perspectives of both theory and 
policy prescription to examine whether the institutional oversight in Europe 
contributes to reporting quality (Holthausen 2009; Pope and McLeay 2011).  This is 
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important because if the institutional oversight system in Europe does not contribute 
to accrual quality, it would be difficult to justify the considerable amount of costs – 
time, money and other resources – involved in establishing national oversight bodies 
and monitoring and enforcing compliance with IFRS.  
Several recent papers examine the effects of IFRS enforcement on market 
development and financial accounting transparency,  market liquidity, abnormal 
returns, abnormal trading volumes and abnormal bid-ask spreads,  and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and dispersion (Brown et al., 2013; Christensen et al. 2013; Hitz 
et al., 2012; Preiato et al., 2013). In contrast with these prior studies, this paper 
examines a different outcome variable – accrual quality and seeks to contribute to 
the emerging literature on IFRS enforcement and reporting quality in Europe.  
 
Institutional oversight systems in Europe 
European countries had diverse institutional oversight systems prior to the adoption 
of IFRS (FEE 2001). In an overview of such systems prior to the adoption of IFRS in 
Europe, FEE (2001) classifies the systems into four types – (a) stock exchange 
(Sweden, Norway and Switzerland), (b) stock exchange regulator (Belgium, France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain), (c) review panel (the UK), and (d) government departments 
(Denmark, the UK, and Czech Republic). FEE (2001) also identifies eight countries 
that had no institutional oversight system (Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Slovenia).  
Regulators, standard-setters, professional organisations and academics have 
emphasised the need for rigorous enforcement mechanisms to achieve high quality 
financial reporting (FEE 2001; Holthausen 2009; US SEC 2000). FEE (1999, p. 6) 
notes that the issue of accounting enforcement is ‘of crucial importance to avoid 
incomplete and inconsistent implementation/ application’. The European IFRS 
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regulation also emphasises the importance of rigorous enforcement of accounting 
standards, particularly a common approach to enforcement (EC 2002, recital n. 16). 
Consistent with the emphasis on enforcement of accounting standards in the IFRS 
Regulation, the now defunct CESR3 released Standard No. 1 on accounting 
enforcement in 2003. The standard prescribes 21 principles for the enforcement of 
accounting standards in Europe and recommends that member countries establish 
institutional oversight systems and conduct accounting standards enforcement 
activities in line with the principles (CESR 2003).  
Standard No. 1 defines enforcement as monitoring compliance of financial 
information with the applicable reporting framework and taking appropriate action 
in case of non-compliance (CESR 2003).4 The standard recommends, inter alia, that 
(a) a competent independent administrative authority should be responsible for 
enforcement of accounting standards and have the necessary powers5 and sufficient 
resources6, (b) the principles of enforcement in the standard should apply to both 
annual and interim financial statements and reports issued by issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading in a regulated securities market, (c) in the case of 
material misstatements, the national enforcer should take appropriate actions to 
achieve appropriate disclosures and where relevant, public corrections of 
misstatements, and (d) actions should be effective, timely and proportional to the 
impact of detected infringement (CESR 2003).   
The standard advocates a mixed model whereby a risk-based approach is 
combined with a rotation/ sampling approach to select issuers and documents for 
enforcement (CESR 2003). It further notes that methods of enforcement on selected 
information range from pure formal checks to in-depth substantive in-nature checks 
and the intensity of review should consider the level of risk, the type of document to 
be examined and the extent of information available on the issuer (CESR 2003). The 
above features of Standard No. 1 suggest that compliance with the standard is likely 
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to contribute to strict enforcement of IFRS and improvement of reporting quality over 
time.  
The CESR (2007) reports on the extent of compliance of European countries with 
Standard No. 1. The report states that, as of 2006, 11 countries7 complied fully with 
Standard No. 1, 10 countries8 complied partially, and eight countries9 did not 
comply. Out of eight countries that did not comply in 2006, three10 would start 
complying in 2007, three11 in 2008, and two12 were in the process of implementing 
their enforcement systems. This suggests that the European national enforcers were 
expected to comply with Standard No. 1 by 2008. This also suggests variation in IFRS 
enforcement activity in European countries during the early years of IFRS adoption 
and this variation offers a unique opportunity to examine the impact of IFRS 
enforcement activity on accrual quality using a difference-in-difference research 
design.  
 
Hypothesis development 
One stated objective of the European enforcement efforts discussed above is to 
monitor and ensure the compliance of financial statements of European listed 
companies with IFRS (CESR 2003). A review of the enforcement decisions published 
by the CESR and ESMA reveals that the decisions pertained to (a) classification (e.g., 
current vs. non-current liabilities, classification in the cash flow statement, 
classification of items in accordance with IAS 8, classification of an intangible asset 
as an intangible asset with indefinite life, and classification of an entity as a 
subsidiary), (b) disclosures (e.g., information regarding material intangibles, separate 
components of income tax, methodology to determine the recoverable amount and 
assumptions used in impairment testing), (c) presentation (e.g., presentation of an 
item either in profit or loss for the period, or other comprehensive income), (d) 
recognition (e.g., revenue recognition), and (e) measurement (e.g., measurement of 
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fair value and accounting treatment of share-based payments, use of the appropriate 
market price to measure the fair value of shares, measurement of the liability 
component of compound financial instruments, measurement of recoverable amount 
and impairment loss, inappropriate application of the definition of the grant date for 
share-based payments) (CESR 2010a, 2010c; ESMA 2011).  
This suggests that European national enforcers monitor and enforce a wide range 
of aspects of financial reporting – classification, presentation, disclosure, recognition 
and measurement – by reporting entities. Issues pertaining to recognition (e.g., 
revenue recognition) and measurement (e.g., use of the appropriate grant date for 
share-based payments, use of the appropriate market price for measuring the fair 
value) clearly impact on accruals. Further, some classification issues also affect 
accounting accruals. For example, the classification of an intangible as having an 
indefinite useful, rather than limited, life affects amortisation expenses. These 
monitoring and enforcement activities are likely to constrain managerial discretion 
in recognition, measurement and classification in accounting and improve accrual 
quality.  
Accrual quality is likely to improve in all the sample countries over time as a result 
of the enhanced enforcement efforts discussed above. However, two factors may 
confound the impact of enforcement activities on accrual quality in the sample. First, 
accrual quality may improve over time as a result of the learning curve effect (Brown 
2011). Managers of European firms may become accustomed to making estimates 
and judgements inherent in IFRS over time, which may improve accrual quality over 
time. Second, the study period 2006-10 contains the economic recession of 2008. As 
a result of criticisms of financial reporting standards and reporting quality in the 
wake of the financial crisis, managers may intensify their efforts to implement IFRS 
properly.13  
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To isolate the impact of improved institutional oversight on accrual quality from 
that of the learning curve phenomenon and economic recession, this paper focuses 
on the impact of oversight on accrual quality in the treatment sample. The treatment 
sample consists of countries with either no or weak institutional oversight systems 
for compliance with IFRS in 2006 and 2007 but improved oversight systems after 
that. On the other hand, the benchmark sample is comprised of countries that had 
stronger oversight systems than the treatment sample from the start (i.e., 2006) of 
the sample period. Thus, the treatment sample is likely to experience the greatest 
improvement in accrual quality during the sample period. Since the learning curve 
effect and the economic recession apply to both the benchmark sample and the 
treatment sample, any incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment 
sample over and above that of the benchmark sample can be attributed to enhanced 
monitoring and enforcement efforts in the treatment sample during the period. Thus, 
the research hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Accrual quality is likely to improve more in the treatment sample countries 
than in the benchmark sample countries as a result of increased enforcement 
activities by European national enforcers. 
 
Methodology 
Accrual quality 
IFRS require managers to make accounting estimates and judgments, and accruals 
under IFRS are the result of these estimates and judgments. As discussed above, 
national institutional oversight bodies in Europe monitor managers’ accounting 
decisions relating to accounting classification, recognition and measurement. 
Therefore, managers and enforcement of IFRS by institutional oversight bodies have 
a direct impact on accruals14  and accrual quality is an appropriate measure of 
reporting outcome for assessing the impact of institutional oversight in Europe. 
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Further, accrual quality has construct validity and can be measured reliably across 
jurisdictions (Schipper 2005). It is a summary indicator of financial reporting quality 
(Francis et al. 2006) and has been widely used as a measure of earnings quality in 
the accounting literature (Francis et al. 2006). Accrual quality is also an important 
dimension of reporting as it impacts on the cost of equity (Francis et al. 2004), asset 
allocation decisions (Florou and Pope 2009), and IPO underpricing (Boulton et al. 
2011). Thus, using accrual quality as an outcome variable is consistent with the 
objective of financial reporting of providing useful information for decision-making.15 
Many accrual models have been used in the literature (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; 
DeAngelo 1986; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Healy 1985; 
Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005). However, there is no conclusive evidence on which 
accrual model is the best (Gul et al. 2009).  
We use the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals. 
This model is augmented by including lagged return on assets and change in cash 
flow from operations (ΔCFO). The Jones (1991) model is widely used in the earnings 
management literature (DeFond, 2010). Lagged return on assets and ΔCFO are 
included as independent variables as proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) and Dechow 
(1994), respectively. This model is expressed as follows: 
 
ACCi,t = α+ β1(1/TAi,t-1) + β2ΔREVi,t + β3FAi,t + β4ROAi,t-1 + β5ΔCFOi,t + εi,t   (1) 
Where: 
 
  
ACCi,t  = total accruals of firm i for year t, measured as profit after tax less 
cash flow from operating activities (CFO), deflated by total assets 
at the end of t-1. 
 
TAi,t-1  = total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
 
ΔREVi,t = change in revenue of firm i in year t, deflated by total assets at 
the end of year t-1. 
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FAi,t  = fixed assets of firm i at the end of year t, deflated by total assets 
at the end of year t-1.16 
 
ROAi,t-1  = lagged return on assets, measured as earnings before interest 
and tax of year t-1 divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
 
ΔCFOi,t = change in cash flow from operations of firm i during t, deflated by 
total assets at the end of year t-1.   
 
 
We apply model (1) to each country-industry-year17 and, following Kothari et al. 
(2005), require each country-industry-year combination to have at least 10 
observations. We take the absolute residual from the model to indicate absolute 
discretionary accruals [|DACC|] and use |DACC| as the measure of accrual quality 
on the premise that both upward and downward adjustments of reported earnings 
are indications of earnings management and, hence, poor earnings quality (Gul et al. 
2009).18 
 
Control variables 
 We include eleven control variables – (a) basis of legal system (common or code), (b) 
the quality of the rule of law, (c) difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS, 
(d) growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (e) change in stock market index, 
(f) market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, (g) revenue growth, (h) absolute 
magnitude of accruals, (i) firm size, (j) leverage, and (k) market-to-book ratio. In 
addition to the eleven control variables, we also control for industry fixed effects.  
Legal origin is used extensively in earnings quality studies (Soderstrom and Sun 
2007). Common law countries have developed stock markets, pre-dominance of 
equity financing, better investor protection, lower ownership concentration and 
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higher spending on auditing services (Ali and Hwang 2000; La Porta et al. 1998). 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) note that the legal system affects earnings quality 
directly through legal enforcement and indirectly through financial reporting 
incentives such as those provided by financial market development, capital 
structures, and ownership structures. Thus, this legal system variable controls for 
many country-level variables that impact on accounting quality (Ali and Hwang 2000; 
Soderstrom and Sun 2007). This dummy variable equals 1 for common law countries 
and 0 for code law countries. 
Prior research (Armstrong et al. 2010; Daske et al. 2008; Florou and Pope 2009; 
Li 2010) documents IFRS benefits (e.g., decrease in cost of equity capital, increase in 
market liquidity and equity ownership) arising from strong legal enforcement and 
uses either the rule of law index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2007, 2008) or the 
average score of the efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption from 
La Porta et al. (1998) as the proxy for legal enforcement. Both proxies broadly 
measure the quality of the legal and judicial system of a country. Since we examine 
the impact of institutional oversight system on accrual quality, we control for the 
quality of the rule of law and use the rule of law index from Kaufmann et al. (2007) 
as the majority of prior studies use this proxy for legal enforcement and Kaufmann 
et al.’s (2007) rule of law index is more recent than the La Porta et al. (1998) index 
(Armstrong et al. 2010; Daske et al. 2008; Florou and Pope 2009).  
The third control variable is the difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS. 
Bae et al.  (2008) document different degrees of discrepancies between pre-IFRS local 
GAAP and IFRS for 49 countries. Since firms domiciled in a country with more 
discrepancies between its pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS may expect larger 
improvement in accrual quality, we control for this variable. We use the Bae et al. 
(2008) measure of difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS and higher 
scores indicate greater discrepancies. 
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GDP growth rate and change in stock market index are used as a control variable 
because the study period includes the recessionary period and there has been 
variation in GDP growth rate and stock market performance across countries in this 
period (Holder et al. 2013). Market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP is used as 
a proxy for the development of the stock market. Demand for accounting information 
from market participants to mitigate the adverse selection problem provides 
incentives for corporate managers to improve the quality of earnings (Soderstrom and 
Sun 2007). Thus, earnings quality is likely to be better in countries where the stock 
market plays an important role in corporate financing.  
Managers of growth firms are likely to manage earnings to avoid earnings 
disappointment (Callao and Jarne 2010). Further, growth firms are likely to operate 
in uncertain environments (Dechow and Schrand 2004). Thus, accrual quality is 
likely to be negatively associated with revenue growth.  
Accrual quality is also likely to be negatively associated with the absolute 
magnitude of accruals as accruals require estimations and judgments, and larger 
accruals (of either sign) may indicate underlying volatility in the companies’ 
operations and may contain estimation errors (Dechow and Schrand 2004). Further, 
prior research finds that managers manage earnings through accruals (Dechow and 
Schrand 2004). This suggests that accruals may reflect managers’ financial reporting 
incentives which may impinge on accrual quality. Therefore, we control for both 
revenue growth and absolute magnitude of accruals. 
Larger firms are more likely to manage earnings than smaller ones to reduce 
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). This suggests a negative relation 
between firm size and accrual quality. However, larger firms have a better 
information environment than smaller ones as larger firms disclose more information 
and are followed by more securities analysts (Hope 2003).19 This suggests a positive 
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relation between size and accrual quality. Hence, we do not hypothesize the direction 
of association between firm size and accrual quality.  
Banks and other lenders have private access to corporate managers (Ball et al. 
2000; Soderstrom and Sun 2007). Thus, the demand for higher quality accounting 
information could be less for firms with higher leverage. Further, prior studies found 
that leverage is associated with earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Duke and Hunt 1990). Thus, accounting quality is likely to be lower in firms with 
high leverage (Soderstrom and Sun 2007). However, accrual quality may be positively 
associated with leverage because lenders have huge financial stakes in the firms and 
hence, have motivation to monitor financial reporting of the borrower. Therefore, we 
do not hypothesize the direction of the relationship between accrual quality and 
leverage.  
Market-to-book ratio is used in the literature as a proxy of unconditional 
conservatism and the accounting literature documents a negative association 
between conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan 
2005; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). Since accruals are used to implement 
conditional conservatism, market-to-book ratio is included as a control variable.   
Research design and empirical model 
This study uses a difference-in-difference research design to test the hypothesis. We 
use a benchmark sample and a treatment sample and data for five years, 2006-10. 
To identify the benchmark and treatment samples, we use the report by CESR (2007). 
The CESR report (2007) provides an update on the state of compliance with the CESR 
(2003) Standard 1 in 2006. We focus on Western European countries20 because 
Eastern European countries do not have long experience with commercial accounting 
and inclusion of these countries in the sample may confound the results.  
The benchmark sample comprises six countries – Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Norway, and the UK. These countries complied fully with Standard No. 1 in 
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2006 and therefore had full enforcement activity from the start of the sample period 
2006-10 (CESR 2007). On the other hand, the initial treatment sample is comprised 
of five countries – Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
Germany and the Netherlands complied partially with Standard No. 1 in 2006 (CESR 
2007). Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden did not comply with Standard No. 1 in 2006 
(CESR 2007). Thus, compared with the benchmark sample countries, the 
institutional oversight systems of the five treatment sample countries were either 
non-existent or relatively weak at the start of the sample period.  
We use 2006-07 as the pre-enforcement period and 2008-10 as the enforcement 
period. The period 2006-07 is treated as the pre-enforcement period because the 
enforcement activity of the treatment sample was presumably weak during this 
period. As discussed above, Germany and the Netherlands complied partially with 
Standard No. 1 in 2006 (CESR 2007). On the other hand, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden did not comply with Standard No. 1 in 2006 but were to start complying with 
the CESR (2003) Standard 1 in 2007 (CESR 2007). Since the oversight system is 
likely to be more effective over time as countries would learn from their own and 
others’ enforcement experiences, we consider the institutional oversight systems of 
these five countries - Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
– during these early years to be relatively weak and treat 2006-07 as the pre-
enforcement period and 2008-10 as the enforcement period.  
To check the reasonableness of the designation of our sample countries as 
belonging to either treatment or benchmark sample, we compare the changes in the 
value of the accounting enforcement index of Brown et al. (2013, Table 5) for our 
treatment and benchmark sample countries. They design an accounting enforcement 
proxy and report its value for their sample countries for 2002, 2005 and 2008. Since 
the pre-enforcement and enforcement periods in our study are 2006-07 and 2008-
10 respectively, we compare changes in the value of Brown et al.’s (2013) accounting 
18 
 
enforcement proxy from 2005 to 2008 for our treatment and benchmark sample 
countries.  
The value of Brown et al.’s (2013) enforcement proxy of only one benchmark 
country – France – declines from 19 in 2005 to 16 in 2008.21 The value of the 
enforcement proxy of the remaining five benchmark countries – Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and the UK – remains the same in 2005 and 2008. On other hand, 
the value of Brown et al.’s (2013) enforcement proxy of four treatment countries – 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden – increased from 2005 to 2008.  
Brown et al. (2013) do not report the value of the accounting enforcement proxy for 
Luxembourg. Therefore, except for France, our classification of sample countries as 
benchmark and treatment countries is consistent with Brown et al.’s (2013) 
accounting enforcement proxy. In sensitivity analysis, we conduct the analysis for 
the sample after excluding France and the results (not reported in table) are similar 
to those reported in this study. 
 
To test the hypotheses, the following Tobit regression model is used:  
 
|DACCi,t| = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGAL+ + 
β5RULEOFLAWk + 6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + 
β8 ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + + 10REVGROWi,t + 
β11|ACCi,t| + β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t  + β14(M/B)i,t  + 
Industry Dummies  + εi,t   
 
(2) 
Where:   
 
|DACCi,t| = absolute discretionary accruals of firm i of year t 
estimated from accrual model (1) 
 
TS  = 1 if the observation is from the treatment sample, 0 
otherwise 
 
ENFOR  = 1 if the observation is from the period 2008-10, 0 
otherwise 
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TS*ENFOR  = interaction between TS and ENFOR 
 
LEGAL  = 1 if the observation is from a common law country, 0 
otherwise 
 
RULEOFLAWk  = the rule of law index of country k in 2006 from Kaufmann 
et al. (2007) 
 
GAAPDIFFK  = difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP of country k and 
IFRS drawn from Bae et al. (2008) 
 
GDPGROWTHk,
t  
= Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of country 
k in year t 
 
MCGDPk,t  = market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP of country 
k in year t 
 
ΔINDEXk,t = change in stock market index of country k in year t, 
 
REVGROWi,t  = the annual change in revenue of firm i from year t-1 to 
year t deflated by sales in year t-1 
 
|ACCi,t|  = the absolute magnitude of total accruals of firm i in year 
t 
 
SIZEi,t  = natural log of total assets of firm i at the end of  year t 
 
LEVi,t   = total debt to total assets of firm i at the end of  year t 
  
(M/B)i,t  = market-to-book ratio of firm i at the end of year t 
 
Industry 
Dummies  
= eight industry dummies used to represent nine 
industries. 
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Since the value of |DACCi,t| is truncated at zero, a Tobit regression is run to 
estimate the coefficients of model (2) (Gul et al., 2009).   β3 (i.e., the coefficient of 
TS*ENFOR) is the coefficient of interest in model (2). As shown in Table 1, (α +β1) and 
(α +β1 + β2 + β3) are the accrual quality of the treatment sample during the pre-
enforcement period and the enforcement period, respectively. On the other hand, α 
and (α +β2) are the accrual quality of the benchmark sample during the pre-
enforcement period and the enforcement period, respectively. The change in accrual 
quality (i.e., β2 + β3) in the treatment sample from the pre-enforcement period to the 
enforcement period could be the result of improvement in institutional oversight as 
well as learning experience with IFRS and the financial crisis of 2008. To mitigate 
the confounding effects of learning experience and the financial crisis, we deduct the 
change in accrual quality in the benchmark sample (i.e., β2) during the same period 
from the change in accrual quality in the treatment sample (i.e., β2 + β3). The 
resulting difference in accrual quality, i.e., β3, is attributed to improvement in 
institutional oversight in the treatment sample from the pre-enforcement period to 
the enforcement period.22 Since a higher value of |DACCi,t| indicates a lower accrual 
quality, a negative sign of β3 will support the hypothesis. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Data and sample 
We start with 18690 firm-year observations for non-financial firms available on 
OSIRIS for 2006-10.  We include a firm-year in our sample if (a) the firm uses IFRS 
in that year’s financial statements23, (b) the firm-year has all the data to calculate 
the model variables, and (c) the firm-year has non-negative book value of equity.24  A 
total of 4872 firm-year observations are excluded from the initial sample because of 
non-compliance with IFRS, 3048 firm-year observations are excluded due to the lack 
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of data to calculate model variables, and 270 firm-year observations are excluded 
due to negative book value of equity. This yields the full sample of 10500 firm-year 
observations. We delete 1% observations (i.e., 201 firm-year observations) at each 
end of the distribution of total accruals and 951 observations for country-industry-
years that do not have at least 10 observations to run the accrual model. This yields 
a final sample of 9339 firm-year observations. Compared with prior IFRS studies, the 
sample size of this study is reasonable. For example, Li’s (2010) sample size is 6456 
firm-year observations from 18 European Union countries, while Callao and Jarne’s 
(2010) sample size is 5632 firm-year observations from 11 European countries. 
 
Table 2 about here 
The full sample includes five treatment countries – Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden – and six benchmark countries – Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Because of the 
requirement of at least 10 observations for each country-industry-year to run the 
accrual model, Ireland and Luxembourg which have small stock markets could not 
enter the final sample. Thus, the final sample includes three treatment countries – 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – and all the six benchmark countries. We 
report results for the final sample in this study.25 However, to include Ireland and 
Luxembourg in the sample, we run the accrual model for each country-year in 
sensitivity analysis and run model (2) for the full sample of 10500 firm-year 
observations. Results (not in table) are similar to those reported in Table 5.  
We collect data on firm-level variables from OSIRIS, data on legal system from La 
Porta et al. (1998), data on the rule of law index of the sample countries from 
Kaufmann et al. (2007), data on the difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and 
IFRS from Bae et al. (2008), data on stock market indices from the websites of the 
22 
 
stock exchanges of the sample countries, and data on GDP growth rates and market 
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP from the website of the World Bank.26 
Table 2 describes the study sample. Panel A of the table outlines how the sample 
was derived.  Panel B shows break-down of the observations by country and year. 
Consistent with their relative economy size and stock market, the UK, France and 
Germany have the highest number of observations while Belgium has the lowest 
number of observations in the sample. Panel C shows the distribution of the sample 
firms by industries.  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for model (2)’s independent continuous 
variables. Panel A compares the treatment sample with the benchmark sample. 
Compared with the benchmark sample, the treatment sample has, on average, 
greater rule of law, greater difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS, higher 
GDP growth rate, greater increase in stock market indices, and lower market 
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Panel B compares the pre-enforcement period (2006-07) with the enforcement 
period (2008-10). Consistent with the global economic recession that started in 2008, 
the enforcement period experiences negative GDP growth rate, decline/slower growth 
in stock market indices, declines in market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, 
revenue growth, firm size, leverage and market-to-book ratio. Panel B also reports an 
increase in mean and median |ACCi,t| from the pre-enforcement period to the 
enforcement period. Hence, we control for all these variables in regression model (2). 
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Impact of institutional oversight on accrual quality 
Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients among model (2)’s independent 
continuous variables. The maximum correlation coefficient is -0.560 between 
GAAPDIFFK and MCGDPk,t. This is well below the 0.80 threshold beyond which 
multicollinearity problems may arise (Gujarati 2003).  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Table 5 reports the results of running model (2). The coefficient of LEGAL positive 
and significant at less than 1 percent, suggesting that common law countries have 
higher |DACCi,t| and hence lower accrual quality. The coefficient of RULEOFLAWk is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that countries with higher rule of 
law have lower |DACCi,t| and higher accrual quality.  
β1 (i.e., the coefficient of the variable TS), which captures the difference in accrual 
quality between the treatment and benchmark samples during 2006-07, is positive 
and significant at less than 1 percent. This suggests that accrual quality was lower 
in the treatment sample than in the benchmark sample during 2006-07. This is 
consistent with weaker oversight systems in the treatment sample than in the 
benchmark sample during 2006-07.  On the other hand, β2 (i.e., the coefficient of 
ENFOR) has a negative sign but is not significant at less than 10 percent. As shown 
in Figure 1, β2 captures the change in accrual quality in the benchmark sample from 
the pre-enforcement period 2006-07 to the enforcement period 2008-10. The 
statistically insignificant β2 suggests a lack of improvement in accrual quality in the 
benchmark sample from 2006-07 to 2008-10. 
 
Table 5 about here 
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β3 (i.e., the coefficient of TS*ENFOR) has the predicted negative sign and is 
significant at less than 1 percent. As explained above, β3 captures the differential 
change in accrual quality in the treatment sample from the pre-enforcement period 
2006-07 to the enforcement period 2008-10 over and above that in the benchmark 
sample. Hence, the observed significant negative sign of β3 suggests incremental 
improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample relative to the benchmark 
sample from the pre-enforcement period to the enforcement period. This supports 
the research hypothesis.  Furthermore, since model (2) controls for, inter alia, legal 
system and rule of law, the observed accrual quality improvement in the treatment 
sample during the enforcement period is incremental to the accrual quality benefits 
attributable to the legal system and the rule of law.     
 
Sensitivity analyses 
 
To test the robustness of the results in Table 5, we conducted the following sensitivity 
analyses.  
Positive and negative discretionary accruals 
The use of absolute discretionary accruals, |DACCi,t|, as the measure of accrual 
quality in this study is premised on the assumption that IFRS enforcement has 
symmetrical effects on both positive and negative discretionary accruals. This is 
consistent with prior studies where monitors (e.g., the auditor) are observed to have 
symmetrical effects on discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998; Gul et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, Watts (1977, p. 67) suggests that losses from overstated income 
are more observable and usable in the political process than forgone gains due to 
understated income. Consistent with this, Nelson et al. (2003, Table 1) find that 
auditors adjust management’s attempts to overstate current period income than 
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attempts to understate income.  This line of argument suggests that national 
enforcers have incentives to monitor overstated profit more stringently than 
understated profit. Therefore, to test whether IFRS enforcement has symmetrical 
effects on discretionary accruals, following Becker et al. (1998) and Gul et al. (2009 
), we run models (3) and (4) for positive and negative discretionary accruals, 
respectively. If IFRS enforcement has symmetrical effects on discretionary accruals, 
it will reduce the size of both positive and negative discretionary accruals. Hence, β3 
will have a negative sign in model (3) but a positive sign in model (4).  
 
PDACCi,t = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGALk+ + 
β5RULEOFLAWk + β6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + 
β8ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + β10REVGROWi,t + 
β11|ACCi,t| + β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t  + β14(M/B)i,t  + 
Industry Dummies  + εi,t 
 
 
 (3) 
NDACCi,t = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGALk+ + 
β5RULEOFLAWk + β6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + 
β8ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + β10REVGROWi,t + 
β11|ACCi,t| + β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t  + β14(M/B)i,t  + 
Industry Dummies  + εi,t 
 
           
(4) 
Where:  
 
 
NDACCi,t = positive discretionary accruals estimated from model (1) 
NDACCi,t = Negative discretionary accruals estimated from model (1) 
 
All other variables are defined as in model (2).  
 
Since both dependent variables, PDACCi,t, and NDACCi,t, of models (3)  and (4) are 
truncated at zero, Tobit regression is used to estimate the coefficients of the models. 
The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 5. Consistent with 
symmetrical effects on discretionary accruals, the coefficient of TS*ENFOR is 
statistically significantly negative in model (3) but significantly positive in model (4), 
suggesting that IFRS enforcement reduces the size of both positive and negative 
discretionary accruals.27 
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Alternative accounting enforcement proxy 
To investigate the sensitivity of our results to our proxy of enforcement, we use Brown 
et al.’s (2013) accounting enforcement proxy for 2008 and run model (5) for 2008.28   
|DACCi,t| = α + β1ENFORCEMENT+ β2LEGAL+ + β3RULEOFLAWk + 
β4GAAPDIFFk + β5GDPGROWTHk,t + β6ΔINDEXk,t + 
β7MCGDPk,t + β8REVGROWi,t + β9|ACCi,t| + β10SIZEi,t + 
β11LEVi,t  + β12(M/B)i,t  + Industry Dummies  + εi,t 
 
 
(5) 
Where 
ENFORCEMEN
T 
 
= 
 
Value of Brown et al. (2013) enforcement proxy for 
2008 divided by 24. A higher value of ENFORCEMENT 
indicates better accounting enforcement and vice 
versa. 
 
Other variables are defined as in model (2).  
The coefficient of ENFORCEMENT is negative and significant at less than 5 percent 
(results not in the table). Taken together, the results suggest that better enforcement 
is associated with lower absolute discretionary accruals and higher accrual quality. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
We examine whether accrual quality improves as a result of improvements in IFRS 
enforcement efforts in Europe. The sample comprises 9339 firm-year observations 
from 9 European countries. Three of these countries - Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden – are designated as the treatment sample and the remaining six 
countries – Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, and the UK - are treated 
as the benchmark sample. Data for five years – 2006-2010 – are used in this study. 
The years 2006-07 are designated as the pre-enforcement period while 2008-10 is 
treated as the enforcement period. The study employs a difference-in-difference 
research design and compares the change in accrual quality in the treatment sample 
from 2006-07 to 2008-10 with that in the benchmark sample in the same period. 
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We observe incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample 
relative to the benchmark sample during the enforcement period 2008-10. Given that 
both the control and treatment samples are subject to the learning curve effect and 
the impact of the recent economic recession, the observed incremental improvement 
in accrual quality in the treatment sample relative to the benchmark sample can be 
attributed to the improvement in institutional oversight over compliance with IFRS.  
Further, we observe these results after controlling for legal system and rule of law, 
which is used as a proxy of legal enforcement in prior IFRS studies (Daske et al. 
2008; Florou and Pope 2009; Li 2010). Therefore, the observed improvement in 
accrual quality in the treatment sample suggests that institutional oversight has an 
incrementally positive impact on accrual quality over and above that attributable to 
legal system and rule of law. The results are robust to alternative accrual quality 
measures, alternative samples and alternative enforcement proxy.  
The findings support the push for greater enforcement efforts in Europe and have 
policy implications for countries contemplating the adoption of IFRS in the future. 
Our paper contributes to the emerging literature on accounting enforcement (Brown 
et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2013; Hitz et al. 2012; Preiato et al. 2013). In contrast 
with these studies, we examine the impact of accounting enforcement on a different 
outcome variable – accrual quality and report results consistent with these studies.   
Caveats are appropriate here. The accounting literature suggests that accounting 
quality is shaped by many factors (Soderstrom and Sun 2007). While we control for 
eleven variables, we recognise that we might not have controlled for all factors. 
Especially, the enforcement period coincides with the global financial crisis (GFC). 
To mitigate the confounding effect of GFC, we use GDP growth rate and changes in 
stock market indices as control variables and the difference-in-difference research 
design. But we recognise that GFC might still confound the results. Further, while 
we use multiple measures of accrual quality in this study, they may be subject to 
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measurement error. We also do not investigate the impact of enforcement efforts on 
other measures of earnings quality (e.g., value relevance of earnings and book value, 
comparability of financial reporting across European countries, conservatism). 
Further, while the CESR (2003) Standard 1 specifies the minimum criteria for 
ensuring effective enforcement of IFRS and compliance with the standard improves 
IFRS enforcement, there may be variations in national enforcement efforts and hence 
variation in accrual quality (Brown et al. 2013; Pope and McLeay 2011). Finally, 
Christensen et al. (2008) conclude that incentives dominate accounting standards in 
shaping accounting quality. Future research may examine the impact of accounting 
enforcement on accounting quality of firms with different reporting incentives.  
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 European listed firms started preparing consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS in 2005 
although many European firms voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005 (Cuijpers and Buijink 2005).  
2 Several benefits have been claimed to emanate from the global adoption of IFRS. These include reduction 
in costs of preparing financial statements according to multiple sets of accounting rules in multiple 
jurisdictions, free flow of capital across the borders, reduced cost for regulators involved in understanding 
different reporting regimes, efficient and better training of auditors, and reduction in cost of capital 
(Tweedie 2006).  
3 The ESMA succeeded the CESR as the pan European supervisory authority in 2010. 
4 The CESR (2003) envisages the scope of enforcement to cover both consolidated and non-consolidated 
accounts and both IFRS and national GAAPs. 
5  The necessary powers should include at least powers to monitor financial information, require 
supplementary information from issuers and auditors, and take appropriate actions consistent with the 
purposes of enforcement (CESR 2003).  
6   Resources include professional, skilled staff experienced with the reporting framework and the legal  
implications of enforcement (CESR 2003). 
7 The countries are Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and 
the UK. 
8 The countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Poland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Malta, and Germany. 
9 The countries are Austria, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, and Ireland. 
10 The countries are Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden.   
11 The countries are Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania. 
12 The countries are Austria and Slovakia.  
13  The criticisms were primarily targeted towards financial reporting by financial institutions (Financial Crisis 
Advisory Group 2009). They, however, have relevance to reporting by non-financial entities (Financial 
Crisis Advisory Group 2009).  
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14 In contrast, the impact of financial reporting decisions of managers and IFRS enforcement on other 
outcome variables (e.g., value relevance) is indirect. For example, the impact of accounting information 
on stock returns depends on how investors interpret accounting information and market psychology.  
15 The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting specifies the objective of general purpose financial 
reporting as follows: 
The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information about the 
reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in 
making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling or 
holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or settling loans and other forms of credit. 
(IFRSF 2012, para. OB2) 
16   Jones (1991) model includes gross PPE rather than fixed assets in her accrual model. Since OSIRIS does  
not provide the value of gross PPE, in sensitivity analysis we use estimated PPE instead of fixed assets in 
model (1) and the |DACCi,t| estimated from that model as the dependent variable in model (2). The 
results (not in table) are similar to those reported in Table 5.  We estimate PPE by deducting land from 
fixed assets. Land value is set to zero if land value is not reported in OSIRIS for a firm-year. 
17 The mean (median) adjusted R2 of 229 country-industry-year specific accrual models is 0.350 (0.350) 
(results not in the table). The explanatory powers of the accrual models in our study are comparable with 
other studies. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2006, Table 3) compared the explanatory powers of 
different accrual models and reported an adjusted R2 that ranged from 4.00% to 30.20%. Further, the 
mean (median) |DACCi,t| in our sample is 4.92% (3.39%) of total assets. In contrast, Gul et al. (2009) 
report a mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 4% (2.6%) of total assets for their US sample. 
Becker et al. (1998) report mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 12.9% (6.3%) and 17% (8.8%) 
of total assets for two sub-samples of US firms. Thus, the magnitude of mean (median) |DACCi,t| in our 
study is consistent with prior studies. 
18  We also run accrual model (6) and use estimated |DACCi,t| in  model (2) to check the sensitivity of the 
results to the accrual model. The results (not in table) are similar to those reported in Table 5.  
 
ACCi,t = α+ β1(1/TAi,t-1) + β2ΔREVi,t + β3FAi,t + β4ΔCFOi,t + εi,t   (6) 
Variables are as defined in model (1). 
 
19 Hope (2003, Table 3) reports a correlation coefficient of 0.14 between firm size and disclosure, and a 
correlation coefficient of 0.41 between firm size and analysts’ following. 
20 We do not include five Western European countries – Austria, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland – in the 
sample because (a) Osiris does not provide cash flow from operations for Italy and Spain, (b) Portugal had 
only six observations in 2006 after applying the filters in this study, (c) CESR (2007) does not clearly state 
whether Austria would comply with CESR (2003) Standard 1, and (d) CESR (2007) does not mention 
Switzerland in its report on compliance with CESR (2003) Standard 1. 
21 Their accounting enforcement proxy has a maximum value of 24 (Brown et al. 2013, Appendix 2). A higher 
value indicates more stringent enforcement and vice versa. 
22 The difference-in-difference research design has been used in the accounting literature to address similar 
research questions (Holder et al. 2013; Kang et al. 2012; Li 2010). Pope and McLeay (2011) also suggest 
this research design for investigating the impact of IFRS.  
23 OSIRIS classifies accounting standards into four types: (a) IFRS, (b) IFRS – NFC, (c) Local GAAP, and (d) 
Accounting standards N/A. We include a firm-year only if the accounting standard type for that firm-year 
is IFRS. NFC stands for ‘not fully complied’. 
24 A negative book value of equity gives a negative market value-to-book value ratio, which is difficult to 
interpret.  Thus, following Pae et al. (2005), we exclude firm-year observations with negative book value 
of equity. 
25   In an additional test, we exclude Sweden from the treatment sample and run model (2) on the ground 
that Sweden had an enforcement mechanism before 2006 (FEE, 2001). The results (not in the table) for 
this reduced sample are similar to those in Table 5. 
26  The website address is http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
27 We re-estimate models (3) and (4) with Huber/White standard errors and covariances (using EViews 
software). The results (not in the table) are very similar to those reported in the last two columns of Table 
5. The coefficient of the variable TS*ENFOR is negative and significant at less than 1 percent in model (3) 
but positive and significant at less than 5 percent in model (4). 
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28  Our study uses data for 2006-10. Brown et al. (2013) report the value of their accounting enforcement 
proxy for 2008. Since accounting enforcement is in a state of evolution in Europe (Brown and Tarca 2005), 
we confine our sensitivity analysis using Brown et al.’s (2013) proxy in this section to 2008 only. 
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Table 1. Difference-in-difference research design 
 
 Pre-enforcement 
period (2006-07) 
 
Enforcement period 
(2008-10) 
 
Enforcement period 
– Pre-enforcement 
period 
 
Treatment 
sample 
α +β1  α +β1 + β2 + β3 β2 + β3 
Benchmark 
sample 
α  α + β2 β2 
Treatment 
sample – 
Benchmark 
sample 
β1 β1 + β3 β3 
Note: The coefficients in this figure are from model (2). α +β1 + β2 + β3 = accrual quality of 
treatment sample during the enforcement period, α +β1 = accrual quality of treatment sample 
during the pre-enforcement period, α + β2= accrual quality of benchmark sample during the 
enforcement period, α = accrual quality of benchmark sample during the pre-enforcement 
period. 
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Table 2. Study sample. 
 
Panel A. Sample derivation 
Total number of observations on non-financial firms for 2006-
10 in Osiris 
 18690 
Less observations not based on full compliance with IFRS  (4872) 
Less observation without data on model variables  (3048) 
Less observations with negative book value of equity    (270) 
Full sample  10500 
Less 1% observations at each end of the total accruals 
distribution 
 210 
  10290 
Less country-industry-year with less than 10 observations  951 
Final sample  9339 
Panel B. Sample observations by country 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Treatment sample:       
Germany 159 302 358 398 399 1616 
The Netherlands 57 62 77 80 81 357 
Sweden 145 175 190 201 119 830 
Benchmark sample:       
Belgium 21 46 50 61 58 236 
Denmark 52 58 59 59 60 288 
Finland  77 79 85 88 86 415 
France 333 363 401 416 402 1915 
Norway 56 74 84 80 92 386 
United Kingdom 322 587 757 800 830 3296 
Total 
 
1222 1746 2061 2183 2127 9339 
Panel C.  Sample observations by industry 
Industry Number of 
observations 
Consumer discretionary 2007 
Consumer staples 554 
Energy 351 
Healthcare 804 
Industrials 2601 
Information technology 2065 
Materials 764 
Telecommunications service 41 
Utilities 152 
Total 9339 
  
Notes: The benchmark sample countries – Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, 
and the UK – had full IFRS enforcement activity in 2006 (CESR, 2007). On the other hand, 
the treatment sample countries – Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden – had either no or partial enforcement activity in 2006 (CESR, 2007). 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for model (2) continuous variables. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics by sample group 
 Treatment Sample 
(n=2803) 
Benchmark sample 
(n=6536) 
  
Variables Mean Median Mean Median t-statistic Wilcoxon statistic 
|DACCi,t| 0.050 0.035 0.049 0.034 0.636 0.775 
RULEOFLAW
k  
1.794 1.770 1.641 1.730 33.215*** 51.148*** 
GAAPDIFFK 9.812 11.000 6.340 1.000 31.848*** 10.513*** 
GDPGROWk,t 1.017 3.269 0.353 1.663 9.531*** 15.121*** 
ΔINDEX 0.046 0.191 0.014 0.090 5.749*** 11.494*** 
MCGDPk,t 68.579 51.946 99.386 107.312 -38.095*** -39.523*** 
REVGROWi,t 0.156 0.070 0.192 0.069 -1.383 1.779* 
|ACCi,t| 0.074 0.056 0.073 0.054 0.789 0.659 
SIZEi,t 5.561 5.293 5.486 5.228 1.494 1.290 
LEVi,t 0.540 0.565 0.537 0.554 0.833 0.657 
(M/B)i,t 2.295 1.570 2.655 1.500 -2.450** 2.532** 
 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics by period 
 Pre-enforcement period (2006-2007) 
(n=2968) 
Enforcement period 2008-2010 
(n=6371) 
  
Variables Mean Median Mean Median t-statistic Wilcoxon statistic 
|DACCi,t| 0.050 0.035 0.049 0.034 1.628 0.671 
GDPGROWk,t 3.163 3.269 -0.664 -0.613 67.774*** 64.144*** 
ΔINDEX 0.098 0.107 -0.011 0.090 20.445*** 5.813*** 
MCGDPk,t 114.401 115.044 78.837 69.913 46.043*** 40.173*** 
REVGROWi,t 0.359 0.220 0.099 0.000 10.192*** 40.911*** 
|ACCi,t| 0.072 0.051 0.074 0.056 -1.646* 3.197*** 
SIZEi,t 5.595 5.380 5.468 5.193 2.581*** 2.958*** 
LEVi,t 0.545 0.571 0.534 0.551 2.510** 2.838*** 
(M/B)i,t 3.434 2.164 2.134 1.273 9.010*** 28.559*** 
  
 Notes: ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively.  
 
|DACCi,t| = absolute discretionary accruals of firm i of year t estimated from accrual model (1), 
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RULEOFLAW
k  
= the rule of law index of country k in 2006, 
GAAPDIFFK  = difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP of country k and IFRS, 
GDPGROWk,t  = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of country k in year t, 
ΔINDEXk,t = change in stock market index of country k in year t, 
MCGDPk,t  = market capitalisation as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product of country k in year t, 
REVGROWi,t  = the annual change in revenue of firm i from year t-1 to year t deflated by sales in year t-1, 
|ACCi,t|  = the absolute magnitude of total accruals of firm i in year t, 
SIZEi,t  = natural log of total assets of firm i at the end of year t,   
LEVi,t  = total debt to total assets of firm i at the end of  year t, and 
(M/B)i,t  = market-to-book ratio of firm i at the end of year t.   
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
   
RULEOFLAW
k 
GAAPDIFFK GDPGROWk,t ΔINDEXk,t MCGDPk,t REVGRO
W 
|ACCi,t| SIZEi,t LEVi,t 
GAAPDIFFK -0.257***         
GDPGROWk
,t 
0.012 0.075***        
ΔINDEXk,t 0.145*** -0.008 -0.106***       
MCGDPk,t 0.020** -0.560*** 0.246*** 0.381***      
REVGROWi,
t  
0.027*** -0.021** 0.088*** 0.020* 0.061***     
|ACCi,t| 0.068*** -0.036*** -0.083*** 0.060*** -0.003 0.036***    
SIZEi,t -0.153*** 0.060*** 0.052*** -0.010 -0.031*** -0.012 -0.159***   
LEVi,t -0.099*** 0.127*** 0.012 -0.036*** -0.106*** -0.023** -0.002 0.372***  
(M/B)i,t 0.027*** -0.049*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.097*** 0.013 0.044*** -0.015 0.138**
* 
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Table 5. Results of running regressions  
 
|DACCi,t| = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGALk+ + 
β5RULEOFLAWk + β6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + 
β8ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + β10REVGROWi,t + β11|ACCi,t| + 
β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t  + β14(M/B)i,t  + Industry Dummies  + εi,t 
 
 
(2) 
PDACCi,t = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGALk+ + 
β5RULEOFLAWk + β6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + 
β8ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + β10REVGROWi,t + β11|ACCi,t| + 
β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t  + β14(M/B)i,t  + Industry Dummies  + εi,t 
 
(3) 
NDACCi,t = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGALk+ + 
β5RULEOFLAWk + β6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + 
β8ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + β10REVGROWi,t + β11|ACCi,t| + 
β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t  + β14(M/B)i,t  + Industry Dummies  + εi,t 
 
(4) 
Variable Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept 0.033 
(4.757***) 
0.052 
(5.304***) 
-0.004 
(-0.402) 
TS 0.013 
(7.014***) 
0.014 
(5.599**) 
-0.011 
(-4.617***) 
ENFOR -0.001 
(-0.406) 
-0.000 
(-0.071) 
0.001 
(0.699) 
TS*ENFOR -0.006 
(-3.252***) 
-0.007 
(-2.785***) 
0.006 
(2.254**) 
LEGAL 0.013 
(4.574***) 
0.013 
(3.255***) 
-0.014 
(-3.512***) 
RULEOFLAWk -0.010 
(-4.204***) 
-0.012 
(-3.692***) 
0.008 
(2.634***) 
GAAPDIFFk -0.000 
(-0.319) 
-0.000 
(-0.190) 
-0.000 
(-0.595) 
GDPGROWTHk,t 0.001 
(3.119***) 
-0.000 
(-0.280) 
-0.002 
(-6.474***) 
ΔINDEXk,t -0.005 
(-2.490**) 
0.000 
(0.087) 
0.012 
(4.080***) 
MCGDPk,t -0.000 
(--0.010) 
-0.000 
(-0.146) 
-0.000 
(-0.456) 
REVGROWi,t -0.000 
(-0.010) 
-0.000 
(-0.439) 
-0.000 
(-0.106) 
|ACCi,t| 0.399 
(66.534***) 
0.344 
(30.999***) 
-0.513 
(-68.166***) 
SIZEi,t -0.003 
(-11.860***) 
-0.003 
(-9.266***) 
0.002 
(7.606***) 
LEVi,t   -0.007 
(-3.010***) 
-0.014 
(-4.341***) 
-0.006 
(-1.822*) 
(M/B)i,t   -0.000 
(-0.939) 
0.000 
(-0.139) 
0.000 
(0.987) 
Industry 
Dummies 
    Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.395 0.246 0.574 
N 9339 4900 4439 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively, t-statistics (two-tailed) are in parentheses.  
|DACCi,t| = absolute discretionary accruals of firm i of year, t estimated from accrual 
model (1). 
PDACCi,t = positive discretionary accruals of firm i of year t estimated from accrual 
model (1). 
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NDACCi,t = negative discretionary accruals of firm i of year t estimated from accrual 
model (1). 
TS =  1 if the observation is from the treatment sample, 0 otherwise, 
ENFOR =  1 if the observation is from the period 2008-2010, 0 otherwise, 
TS*ENFOR =  interaction between TS and ENFOR, 
LEGAL = 1 if the observation is from a common law country, 0 otherwise, and 
Industry 
Dummies 
= eight industry dummies are used to represent nine industries.  
Other variables are as defined in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
